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 1. Introduction 
Non-tariff measures (NTMs) cover all policies affecting trade other than tariff and other tax instruments at 
the border. When markets function well and do not exhibit imperfections such as externalities or 
information asymmetries, NTMs often reduce welfare and distort trade flows like tariff would. However, 
when imperfections are present NTMs differ fundamentally from more conventional trade barriers such as 
tariffs and quotas (see van Tongeren et al. 2009). In particular, standard-like NTMs are playing an 
increasing role in international trade. Some of them may still have protectionist purposes, especially in a 
context of decreasing tariff barriers. However, some others are adopted by policymakers to address these 
market imperfections. In such cases, NTMs may be trade facilitating and welfare enhancing. Trade can 
expand when the perceived quality of imported goods is improved by the standard-like NTM such as 
imported certified organic coffee. Another case is when foreign suppliers satisfy the NTM at a lower cost 
than domestic suppliers do like for low-carbon biofuel imports from Brazil into OECD markets. The 
literature measuring the restrictiveness of trade policy, through the computation of various indices, has 
failed to consider these welfare and trade enhancing effects and the context of market imperfections. Our 
paper fills this gap. 
With global sourcing, it becomes challenging to guarantee products’ safety and quality and to 
mitigate negative externalities. Standards and regulations affecting quality help overcome asymmetric 
information issues. Occasional recalls by toy, pharmaceutical and food companies illustrate the 
importance of various safety concerns, such as lead paints in children toys (Lipton and Barboza, 2007). 
Consumers may also care about global commons and avoid purchasing products obtained using 
unsustainable environmental practices. To preserve their reputation, large firms (e.g. Home Depot, IKEA, 
etc.) have shown strong support for forest certification (McDermott and Cashore, 2009). Similarly, 
consumer welfare is improved by quality requirements limiting residues of dangerous pesticides and 
antibiotics in food products (Disdier and Marette, 2010). 
In this context, regulatory interventions have strong economic and political support, despite risks 
of inefficiency and distortions. For example, groundless precautionary measures could be an expedient 
 way to address consumer concern. The effects of these regulatory instruments are indeed complex not 
only because instruments vary across countries and are imperfect but also because they impact costs of 
heterogeneous producers (Carrère and de Melo, 2011). Meeting the NTMs is costly for both domestic and 
foreign suppliers and often more so for the latter. In the context of North-South trade, these impacts have 
been contentious as they may hinder or enhance trade depending on the net effect of these standards 
(Jaffee and Henson, 2005). While a regulation may thwart a market failure and facilitate trade between 
countries, it may also reduce market access for foreign producers who cannot easily comply with this 
regulation. To illustrate, between October 2006 and 2007, the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission 
(CPSC) announced 473 products recalls of which 389 cases involved imported products (CPSC, 2008). 
This last effect may outweigh the “legitimate action” to mitigate a market failure. Both trade and welfare 
impacts of regulation are ambiguous and in general hard to evaluate. A rigorous empirical measure of 
these impacts therefore requires a consistent framework, as proposed here.  
We consider a small open economy, distorted, first, by arbitrary tariffs and other domestic price 
policy distortions, and second by market imperfections and existing NTMs allegedly addressing them. We 
pay particular attention to NTMs and their protective effects against import competing products, as well as 
their potential demand enhancing effects when NTMs reduce information asymmetries and trade cost. We 
then extend the trade restrictiveness index (TRI) approach of Anderson and Neary (2005) to this more 
general and realistic case encompassing market failures and the existing domestic regulations addressing 
them.  
The TRI approach of Anderson and Neary (1992, 1994, 1996, 2003, and 2005) provides a 
welfare-based consistent aggregation of various trade distortions into a scalar uniform surtax factor, 
equivalent to these distortions in terms of their welfare effects. The TRI approach is a concept applying to 
a whole economy because it relies on the balance of trade approach. Nevertheless, it has been applied 
successfully to partial equilibrium and multi-market situations for both developed and developing 
economies. Feenstra (1995) has proposed some simplifying assumptions greatly fostering the applicability 
of the approach by reducing the number of price responses to estimate or calibrate in the implementation. 
 The TRI and its extensions such as the Mercantilist TRI (MTRI) of Anderson and Neary (2003) have been 
used to derive the tariff equivalent of arbitrary tariff structures (Anderson and Neary, 1994), tariffs and 
quotas (Anderson and Neary, 1992 and 2005), tariffs and domestic production subsidies (Anderson et al., 
1995; Anderson and Neary, 2005; Beghin et al., 2003), and tariffs and AVEs of other NTMs (Hoekman 
and Nicita, 2011; Kee et al., 2009; Lloyd and MacLaren, 2008; and Bratt, 2012), among others. All these 
applications abstract from external effects or informational asymmetries, which we allow for explicitly. As 
shown in these applications, the TRI approach provides a consistent aggregation of distortionary effects of 
various policy instruments into a single “total” AVE within a given sector. The latter property explains the 
recent success and popularity of the approach in empirical investigations of NTMs in presence of tariffs 
and other price policies at the sector level.  
The novelty of the present paper is to allow for market imperfections and trade facilitating effects 
of NTMs in the TRI framework. Despite its inherent ability to capture second-best situations, the 
determination of the TRI under market failure has been overlooked in the trade literature. The only related 
effort in this direction is from Chau et al. (2007) who develop a quantity-based distance function, a trade 
restrictiveness quantity index, in presence of environmental externalities but abstracting from existing 
policy interventions. Outside of the TRI literature, recent empirical investigations note that NTM regimes 
can facilitate trade (see Cadot and Gourdon, 2012, for a review). Reputation and certification processes 
increase trust in exchange (Blind et al., 2013); quality standards help reputation and reputation loss can be 
detrimental to trade (Jouanjean, 2012); and transparency provisions in trade agreements can facilitate 
regulated trade flows (Lejárraga et al., 2013). 
We fill this gap in the TRI-related trade literature: we consider the TRI of arbitrary tariffs, 
domestic production subsidies, and NTMs in presence of possible external effects.1 This undertaking is a 
                                                            
1 Several investigations using the standard gravity equation approach find some trade facilitating effects of 
NTMs but without a rationalization based on some demand increasing effect or market imperfection 
presumably mitigated by the NTMs being analyzed (see Li and Beghin, 2012). 
 substantive step forward for two reasons. First, trade policy reforms often occur in the context of market 
imperfections such as asymmetric information or negative externalities imposed on some agents. 
Accounting for these imperfections is relevant and has been the central pillar of the trade and environment 
literature using the dual approach to trade (Copeland, 1994; and Beghin et al., 1997). Surprisingly, this 
case has eluded the TRI literature. Second, numerous NTMs have been emerging in the last 15 years for 
several reasons, including potential protectionism, but also to address consumer and retailer concerns for 
health and the environment and associated external effects. A priori, excluding potential market 
imperfections when analyzing NTM policy reforms biases results and could lead to erroneous policy 
recommendations. Not surprisingly, sectoral AVEs and TRI estimates are likely to exhibit upward bias 
when they are econometrically constrained to treat all policies as trade-reducing. We depart from this 
restrictive premise and start from an agnostic prior on the impact of NTM policies on trade and welfare. 
We then apply the proposed framework to the NTM global database of Kee et al. (2009) 
consisting of a large cross section of products (at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System – HS – 
classification) and importing countries. We derive ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) for so-called technical 
regulations in their NTM database. These measures are standard-like measures potentially addressing 
market imperfections, rather than other NTMs (e.g., quantity restrictions, price control and monopolistic 
measures) that impede trade.2 We also compute AVEs for other policy distortions (tariffs and domestic 
production subsidies). 12% of HS 6-digit lines are affected by these NTMs and 39% of these (4.7% of the 
lines) exhibit negative AVEs of NTMs, indicating a net trade-facilitating effect of NTMs in those sectors. 
These AVEs are then used to evaluate the restrictiveness of the trade policy defined by countries. TRIs 
computed with these AVEs reflect the frequent trade facilitating effect of NTMs. Accounting for these 
trade-facilitating effects significantly reduces previous measures of trade policy restrictiveness for most 
countries obtained while forcing standard-like NTMs to be trade impeding. These trade-facilitating effects 
                                                            
2 Earlier versions of our analysis were based on the full set of NTMs and reached similar qualitative 
results with these less appropriate NTM data. 
 cast doubt on the predominant presumption that technical regulation NTMs are exclusively protectionist 
and cannot possibly boost trade, let alone welfare.  
 Our paper proceeds as follows. We present the framework in Section 2. We then describe the data 
and detail the econometric approach in Section 3. Section 4 presents the estimation results of AVEs and 
TRIs. We conclude in Section 5. 
 
2. The TRI framework with market imperfection 
We follow the standard TRI approach with the balance of trade function derived from the dual approach to 
trade for a small open distorted economy. We build on the usual framework with a negative externality 
affecting the representative consumer as in Copeland (1994). The externality is assumed exogenous to the 
consumer but influenced by the policymaker via some NTM regulations such as standard-like regulations. 
These regulations may not be set optimally and may be set at a protectionist level as in Fisher and Serra 
(2000). 
 
2.1.  Market demand and supply, and balance of trade function 
The utility of the representative consumer is u(x, H(NTM)) with non-negative market goods x and 
negative externality H influenced by a vector of standard-like NTM policies, NTM, and with the usual 
definitions and properties:3 
.0/ with )(
;0/ and 0/


NTMHNTMHH
Huuxuu Hx
 
                                                            
3 We could complicate the model by assuming that imports m influence the health externality or 
H(m(NTM), NTM). This would make health depends on all the arguments influencing imports and 
generate clutter with multiple feedback effects of all policies through health. The effect of NTM alone on 
health generates the possibility of trade enhancements which is what we are after. The direction of 
potential bias from ignoring these feedback effects is unclear to us. 
 All domestic consumer prices p are inclusive of the exogenous world price wp, a tariff τ, and the 
unit cost equivalent of the domestic NTM on foreign suppliers to sell in the domestic market, or p = wp + 
τ + t(NTM).4 
Given domestic prices p, the associated expenditure function is: 
 );|'(),,( HHuuxpMinHupe
x
 ,  
with the usual derivative properties: 
.0/ and ,0))(,,(/  HeeNTMHupxpee Hp   
Expenditure function e exhibits all the usual homogeneity and curvature properties in prices, 
implying p’epp=0, eH=p’epH, eu=p’epu ; epNTM = epH HNTM , and f’eppf ≤ 0 for any arbitrary vector f of similar 
dimension as p. The marginal damage eH of the negative externality is positive for any given utility level. 
To keep utility constant, expenditure has to increase when the negative externality increases. Partial 
derivative eu is the inverse of the marginal utility of income assumed positive. We eventually simplify 
preferences to follow Feenstra (1995) in the empirical investigation section.  
The impact of the NTM policy encompasses several possible cases. The demand enhancing case is 
epNTM = epH HNTM < 0. Protectionism of the NTM is implied by HNTM = 0 because the policy does not 
address an externality or is not based on science. Another special case could be that the NTM policy 
affects H (Hntm<0) but that H(NTM) does not affect a particular demand (particular good n) directly, or 
epnH = 0. In this case, the policy is not protectionist per se but addressing the market imperfection has no 
bearing on that particular demand for good n. These last two cases show the difficulty to gauge revealed 
                                                            
4 Domestic and foreign firms have heterogeneous cost of meeting the NTM standard as explained later in 
the production component of the model and we assume that domestic firms are more efficient at meeting 
these NTMs. 
 protectionism.5  
For integrability of the Hicksian demands into the expenditure function, at least one of the 
demands represented by x has to be influenced by the external effect H. To illustrate, H could be the 
negative health effect of consuming products that are hazardous if minimum quality standards are not 
imposed on their production. The standard reduces the occurrence of sickness, which may affect the 
demand for these products, and possibly other demands via better health (reduced medical expenditure, 
more active leisure activities) or none other at all (all other demands independent of health status). Similar 
examples can be constructed with environmental external effects such as global commons or consumer 
packaging waste in retail consumption. 
On the production side, domestic supply decisions in competitive industries are derived from the 
gdp function: 
( max(, ) ' ( , ) 0) ,p p
y
gdp p p y y zz g   
with y denoting the net output vector, z the vector of fixed national endowments, and pp the vector of 
producer prices. Producer prices include production subsidies, s, such as farm subsidies, not seen by 
consumers, . World prices can be normalized to 1 so the distortions s, t, and τ 
are viewed indifferently as either ad valorem or specific policy distortions. For simplicity we assume that 
domestic firms already meet the standards implied by NTM but that foreign firms may not. A more 
complicated framework affecting both domestic and foreign firms could be included but the essence here 
is that t(NTM) captures the asymmetric protective effect of NTM at the border on foreign industries.6 The 
                                                            
5 Demand not being enhanced by the NTM policy is not sufficient although suspicion of protectionism 
may arise. 
6 NTM would then enter the GDP function and the derivative  would represent the 
leftward shift of domestic supplies caused by the NTM policies. The unit cost equivalent of yNTM would be 
assumed to be smaller than t(NTM) to indicate a net protective effect of NTM on domestic suppliers as in 
( )pp wp t NTM s   
pNTM NTMgdp y
 gdp function has the usual envelope and homogeneity properties:  
= 0;  and ' 0 for a/ ;  ' ; ny/ ' .'p p p p pp p ppp f ggdp p y p gdp gdp p y p p g p dp fd f        
For convenience we also define compensated excess demand functions m, with 
( , , ( ), , ) ( , , ( ) ( , )p pm p p H NTM u z x p u H NTM y p z  , with partial derivatives indicated by the 
appropriate subscript as for functions e and gdp.  
Now we have all the elements to develop the balance of trade function B: 
( , )  
( ) '( ( , , ) )) ' ).
p
p p p
B p, p wp, NTM,z,H, u
e(p, u, H NTM )- gdp(p , z) - τ x p u H  - y(p ,  z s y(p ,  z

       (1) 
Variable B indicates the amount of foreign exchange necessary to sustain utility u given NTM, wp, z, s, 
and τ. Homogeneity in prices and envelope properties of e and gdp lead to a simpler formulation of (1) 
seemingly omitting tariff revenues and production subsidy costs.  
( , , , , ( ), ) (1 ( )) '( ( , , ( )) - ( , ).p pB p p wp  z H NTM  u t NTM x p  u  H NTM y p  z             (1’) 
 
2.2. Trade restrictiveness indices with externality 
The TRI problem in our case is to find a scalar T equivalent (holding utility constant) to standard-like 
policies, tariffs, and production subsidies to apply as a tariff surcharge on world prices such that:  
0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
( (1 ), (1 ), , , (0), )
( ( ), ( ) , , , ( ), ) .
B wp T wp T wp z H u
B wp t NTM wp t NTM s wp z H NTM u B 
  
            (2) 
The tariff surcharge accounts for several components: tariffs τ, domestic production subsidies s, 
the demand shift via H(NTM), and the protective effect from raising foreign cost to satisfy technical 
measure NTM, that is, t(NTM).  
Next, as in Anderson et al. (1995), while holding u constant, we differentiate equation (2) with 
respect to T, τ, s, and NTM to derive the relative change in T rather than T as it is customarily done in the 
TRI literature. This step yields: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
Fisher and Serra (2000).  
pgdp
 ' ' ' ' '( ) ( )( /  ) ,p p pp p H NTMp p pB wp B wp dT B B d t NTM dNTM B ds B H dNTM            (3) 
with subscripts denoting the variable involved in the partial derivative of B. Solving for dT yields:  
' ' ' ' ' ' '(1/ ( ))[( ) (( ) /  + ) ],p p p pp p p H NTMp p p pdT B wp B wp B B d B ds B B t NTM B H dNTM          (4) 
with partial derivatives Bi: 
' '
' '
'
;
( ) ;
( ( )) 0. 
p
p pp
ppp
H pH
B e
B s gdp
B wp t NTM e


 
 
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Equation (4) shows that the TRI has three policy components corresponding to the tariff, subsidy, 
and NTM policies. The NTM component is the sum of a demand effect via reduced externality H, and a 
NTM protectionist effect relative to foreign goods (through a tariff equivalent t increasing in NTM). While 
the sign of this protectionist effect on imports is clear, the combined effect of NTM on m via the 
externality H and the protectionist effect t(NTM) is ambiguous as their relative magnitude is unknown 
analytically. For example, a pure protectionist NTM policy imposing useless labeling requirements would 
raise t(NTM) and have no effect on consumers’ perception and would lead to a welfare loss and trade 
contraction. Conversely, standards requiring safe goods including imported ones are likely to lead to a net 
demand-enhancing effect lowering transaction costs for consumers. The latter NTM policy would be trade 
and welfare enhancing. The econometric investigation will sort the NTM regimes into trade reducing and 
trade facilitating since we do not impose any “protectionist” NTM prior. 
Next, to further elucidate these effects and undertake our empirical investigation, we assume a 
simplified structure for the Hessian matrix of cross-price responses (epp - gdppp) as in Feenstra (1995), and 
others. The Hessians epp and gdppp are each assumed to be diagonal and constant, which leads to 
 ' '0 and 0 if   and  are non negativepppB B s  .7 From these conditions we derive an implementable 
framework to approximate the sector total AVE corresponding to all policy types τ, s and NTM as well as 
the implied TRI and the MTRI. In general, if the Hessian matrices of price responses of imports (or 
demand and supply responses) are not constrained to be diagonal, off-diagonal elements can be positive or 
negative and it is impossible a priori to sign elements of and pp pB B and therefore the change in the 
TRI, dT. The computation of T is obviously cumbersome in the presence of cross-price effects and non-
constant slopes. 
We recover TRI T from dT as in Feenstra (1995) and Kee et al. (2009), which is equivalent to the 
initial tariffs, subsidies, and NTMs relative to a world with all policies set to 0 by integrating both sides of 
(4) with respect to T going from zero to T and policies going from (0,0,0) to (τ, s, NTM). The latter 
approach works only if dT is non-negative. This step yields: 
(1/ '( )) ( ) ,p ppp pp p p NTMpT wp gdp e wp B B B B TMs N                     (5) 
with ' '( ) /  +pNTM p H NTMpB B B t NTM B H    whose sign is undetermined. The original formula in 
Feenstra (1995) contains the first positive element from tariffs abstracting from s and NTM. Here, two 
additional components originate from production subsidies (positive contribution to the TRI), as long as 
subsidies are positive, and from NTM policies (ambiguous sign). The formula in Kee et al. (2009) has the 
protectionist effects of tariffs and subsidies and a protectionist effect of NTMs. No externality or demand 
enhancement appears in their equation. This additional effect included in our equation (5) can potentially 
facilitate trade and complicates the simple narrative of obstructive NTM policies and their tax equivalent. 
Equation (5) is in essence the square root of a weighted sum of deadweight losses from tariff, production 
                                                            
7 This simplification reduces price effects to the own-price effect, and homogeneity holds implicitly by 
defining prices relative to a numéraire good.  See also Lloyd and MacLaren (2010) for other structures of 
price responses. 
 subsidies, and the welfare effects of NTMs. If the latter is a pure protectionist policy, then BHHNTM is zero 
(no demand shift) and the dead weight loss from the tariff equivalent t(NTM) is added to the sum of 
deadweight losses. If the NTM policy facilitates trade, then the latter maps into a welfare gain. Removing 
the NTM decreases the TRI as welfare falls with its removal. If the latter effect dominates the 
distortionary effect of tariffs and subsidies, then dT is negative and T cannot be recovered using (5). 
Instead, the change in TRI, dT, is the form of choice as in the early TRI investigations (e.g., Anderson et 
al., 1995). 
These effects are illustrated in partial equilibrium in Figure 1. Figure 1 shows the two effects of 
the NTM policies, that is, the demand enhancement shift (from x to x’ with greater utility achieved with 
reduced health hazard), and the increase in border price (wp+t(NTM)+τ) reflecting the international cost of 
meeting the country’s standard and the tariff, and their total effects on imports m. In previous 
investigations only the border price effect of NTM, t(NTM), was considered and the trade (and welfare) 
impact of NTM on imports was detrimental by assumption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The impact of NTMs on demand, supply and imports 
 
 
 
m(wp) 
wp+τ 
wp+τ+t(NTM) 
x        x’ 
             y 
x, y, m 
p 
wp 
m(wp+τ+total AVE(NTM)) m(wp+τ+t(NTM)) 
 Along with the TRI, we consider the MTRI, which holds aggregate imports (wp’m) constant. The 
MTRI yields the tariff equivalent to all distortions holding aggregate trade unchanged but allowing for 
welfare variation. The MTRI is derived in Anderson and Neary (2003) and Kee et al. (2009) who call it 
the overall TRI (OTRI). The derivation of the MTRI follows the spirit of the derivation of the TRI and we 
only present its final formula in equation (12). We refer readers to Anderson and Neary (2003) for details. 
An important consequence from the potential presence of trade-enhancement effects and negative 
AVEs from NTMs is that our TRI and MTRI estimates will be equal or smaller than the TRI and MTRI 
where all policies are constrained to be trade reducing. We discuss this important point in the empirical 
section. 
 
2.3. The import equation to estimate 
Next, we derive the import equation to estimate and the AVEs of all policy instruments. Totally 
differentiation of m (holding u constant) for changes in exogenous variables leads to a change in imports 
of good n in any country equal to: 
( / ) ( / ) [( / )( / )
( / )( / )] ( / ) .
n n n n n n n n n n n
n n n n n n
dm m dp d y p ds m dp t NTM
x H H NTM dNTM y z dz
        
                  (6) 
Equation (6) and m provide a way to estimate the response of imports to tariffs, subsidies, and 
NTM policies, and other variables as in Feenstra (1995). We then derive the estimate of the AVE to the 
net effect of NTM policies on good n. Unfortunately we cannot separately identify the individual effects 
of NTM on m in (6), but we can estimate their net effect. Following a common practice we move the tariff 
effect on the left hand side of (6) and the general specification for the import demand of good n in country 
c (as indicated by superscript n,c) is: 
, , , , ,
, , ,ln ln(1 ) .
n c n c z n c S n c NTM n c
n c n k k n c n c
k
m z s NTM                     (7) 
Elasticity n,c is the own-price response of import of good n in country c.  is the sum of two AVE 
components (the tariff equivalent of NTM on world prices, and the ambiguous import subsidy/tax effect of 
,
NTM
n c
 NTM via decreased externality). Note that the latter AVE component is bound to the left to -100% as 
prices are non-negative. This non-negative constraint provides a lower bound of -100% on cn
NTM
,  if we 
further assume that there is no trade impediment effect of the NTM policy (t(NTM)=0) at the border. This 
is a limit case to establish the lowest non-negative prices faced by agents in the economy.8  
Equation (7) once estimated provides the basis for the total AVE of NTM policies on good n,
, which is:  
, ,/ , with 1 .total
NTM NTM NTM
n c n c totalAVE AVE                 (8) 
An AVE is developed similarly for production subsidies, based on the fact that 
cncn
S
cn
SAVE ,,, /)1(   , with ( ). Unfortunately, parameter γ is not readily known as we 
only have estimates of import demand price elasticities and not the underlying output and demand price 
responses. Hence, we estimate a lower bound to the production subsidy AVE by abstracting from fraction 
(1-γ). Alternatively, the production subsidy AVE estimate could be seen as a market price support subsidy, 
affecting both consumer and producer prices. This assumption is common although not fully accurate.9 
Next, we specify as a transformation of an exponential such that it satisfies a lower bound on 
the total AVE of the NTM effects as before and in addition allowing for fixed effects per commodity and 
interaction terms with country-specific exogenous shifters (endowments) z. For a continuous NTM 
variable, this leads to , with parameter a constrained such that the 
AVE of NTM is lower bounded at -1 or -100%. The corresponding value is a=||εn,c||. If NTM is 
                                                            
8 A small number of observations is concerned by this lower bound (1.4% of the AVEs).  For simplicity, 
we decided to impose the constraint in all tariff lines. Alternatively, the constraint could have been 
imposed only in the tariff lines with a negative AVE. This alternative approach would however have 
slightly changed the density but not the results. 
9 See also Lloyd and MacLaren (2010) footnote 4 for an elaboration of this point. 
NTM
totalAVE
/
/= x p m p    
,
NTM
n c
,
, ( )exp
NTM NTM NTM n c
n c n nk k
k
a z    
 approximated by a dichotomous variable, then the various partial derivatives of m, and t with respect to 
NTM do not exist and are replaced by the first difference of m for NTM equal to one and zero. This leads 
to an alternative formula of the total NTM AVE ( dumNTM
total
AVE ) following Halvorsen and Palmquist 
(1980): 
         (9) 
The lower bound condition in (9) is slightly more cumbersome with a dichotomous NTM. The 
intuition is that  cannot be too large of a positive number (not to blow up the magnitude of 
the AVE in (9) with its negative denominator) to keep producer and consumer prices non-negative (or that 
 or ). Using the same specification as for the continuous 
variable case of , we specify the lower bound constraint for the dichotomous case using parameter a 
in with . For small values of , the 
dichotomous and continuous values of a are approximately equal. 
A parallel formulation is used for 
k
cn
knk
S
n
S
cn
S z )exp( ,,  . As production subsidy s is 
positive, presumably its AVE would not lead to negative producer price issues.  
The total AVE of all distortions, that is, tariffs, NTMs, and subsidies for good n in country c is 
then (assuming the normalization wp=1): 
.,,,, cn
s
cn
NTM
cncn AVEAVETOT                         (10) 
The TRI in equation (5) translates into:  
1/22
,( / )
( / )
nc nc n c
n
c
nc nc
n
m p TOT
T
m p
        

 .                        (11) 
Again, if (4) gives a negative dT, then (11) cannot be used and the change in TRI, dT, is kept to 
express the change in the index equivalent to the welfare impact of the policy interventions. Recall that dT 
, ,[exp( ) 1] / ,  with 1 .dum dum
NTM NTMNTM
total n c n c totalAVE AVE    
,exp( ) 1
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, ,exp( ) 1
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n c n c   , ,ln(1 )NTMn c n c  
,
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,
, ( )exp
NTM NTM NTM n c
n c n nk k
k
a z     ,ln(1 )n ca   ,n c
 is expressed as a sum of consumer welfare changes, and that T is the square root of a positive sum of 
deadweight losses.  
As noted above, we use the same data and AVE estimates to compute the MTRI, merccT : 
,( / )
( / )
nc nc n c
merc n
c
nc nc
n
m p TOT
T
m p
        

 .                        (12) 
 
3. Data and econometric specification 
We use the UNCTAD10-Comtrade database of Kee et al. (2009)11 as well as their import demand estimates 
(Kee et al., 2008) to estimate the import demand equation (7), recover AVEs (equations (9) and (10)) at 
the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System (HS), and compute the MTRI and TRI, (and dTRI) equivalents 
to the three types of distortions (tariffs, NTMs and subsidies) as in equations (11) and (12) (or (4) for 
negative dTRI) for each country. 
 
3.1. Data 
Trade data come from the Comtrade database. We use the average of imports at the HS 6-digit line by 
importing country between 2001 and 2003. Import demand elasticities are extracted from Kee et al. 
(2008). Tariff data are taken from the UNCTAD and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Tariffs are for 
the most recent year for which data are available between 2000 and 2004. For specific tariffs, ad valorem 
equivalents are used. Data on NTMs are from the UNCTAD TRAINS (Trade Analysis and Information 
System) database with only technical regulations selected. As mentioned previously, we abstract from 
                                                            
10 United Nations Conference for Trade and Development. 
11 As recently pointed by Breaux et al. (2013), the new NTM data collection effort under the interagency 
MAST project seems to be problematic and less promising than one could have hoped. The older TRAINS 
database appears more reliable than the new MAST dataset.  
 other NTMs (e.g., quantity restrictions, price control and monopolistic measures) included in the database 
as they are heterogeneous and different from standard-like policies in their potential effects on demand. A 
dummy is set to one if the importing country imposes at least one technical regulation on a given HS6 
product. Regarding production subsidies, the global dataset of Kee et al. (2009) covers agricultural 
domestic support. The source is the WTO domestic agricultural support notifications. This continuous 
variable is in dollars and its log form is used in the estimations.  
Countries’ characteristics are measured by the economic size (gross domestic product – GDP), 
and relative factor endowments (agricultural land over GDP, capital over GDP, and labor over GDP). Data 
are extracted from the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. Two geographical variables are 
also introduced: a dummy for islands and a measure of remoteness (average distance to world markets 
defined as the import-weighted distance to each trading partner). Our sample includes 93 importing 
countries and 4,934 products (HS6 lines).  
 
3.2. Econometric specification  
We run estimations HS 6-digit line by HS 6-digit line. To control for the potential endogeneity of NTMs 
and production subsidies, we instrument them using exports, GDP-weighted average of the NTM dummy 
variable at the HS 6-digit of the 5 closest neighbors (in terms of geographic distance) and the GDP-
weighted average of the agricultural domestic support at the HS 6-digit of the 5 closest neighboring 
economies (Kee et al., 2009). The instrumented estimation is performed in two stages. We first estimate a 
probit where the dependent variable is the presence or the absence of a technical regulation NTM and the 
explanatory variables are the instruments. The Mills ratio derived from this first stage is then included in 
the second stage equation. If one (or more) country provides production subsidies, instruments for this 
variable (exports, GDP-weighted average of the agricultural domestic support of the 5 closest neighbors) 
are also included in the second stage equation. 
The quantity impact of the standard-like NTMs and production subsidies is then transformed into 
price-equivalents (AVEs) using the provided import demand elasticities. AVEs are calculated for each 
 importing country and HS6 line. We impose a positive cap AVEs at 50 for a few extreme values (0.01% 
of the observations).12 To facilitate the interpretation of the results, we compute the mean over all 
importing countries at the HS6 and HS2 levels. HS2 is used in tables for ease of reporting summary 
tendencies. Following our estimation, 4.7% of AVEs for NTMs at the HS 6-digit level are negative, i.e., 
highlighting trade-facilitating NTMs. Without constraint on the sign of the AVEs, our procedure allows us 
to keep these negative values in our sample. AVEs of NTMs, tariffs and production subsidies are then 
aggregated at the country level to derive the trade restrictiveness indices corresponding to all three types 
of policy interventions. 
Finally, we use bootstrapping to compute the standard deviations of the AVEs. The main 
advantage of this procedure is to account for sampling and estimation errors of the AVEs. We draw (with 
repetition) 200 random samples from our dataset and perform the AVEs estimation for each of these 
samples. Estimations are run HS6 line by HS6 line. We then compute the bootstrap standard errors as the 
standard deviations of these 200 AVEs. 
 
4. Results 
We first present the results on AVEs of NTMs in the presence of externalities. We also provide 
comparisons with the AVEs obtained when the latter are constrained to be trade reducing.  
4.1. AVEs of NTMs 
We focus the discussion on the results obtained for the first 20 HS sections.13 Qualitative conclusions are 
unchanged if the discussion of results is performed at the HS 2-digit level (with 96 sectors, see Table A.1 
of the Appendix). Table 1 first reports the simple frequency ratio of NTMs for each HS section, i.e., the 
                                                            
12 If we set the cap at 100 (symmetric cap as the one imposed to negative AVEs), then the share of 
concerned observations is 0.006% instead 0.01% and our results remain unchanged. We chose a lower 
bound (50) to limit distortions. 
13 Section XXI (objects of art and antiques) has very few HS6 lines with NTMs and is not reported. 
 share of HS6 lines within each HS section for which at least one importing country of our sample imposes 
at least one technical regulation NTM. The frequency ratio of NTMs should be interpreted as follows: for 
section I “live animals, animal products”, the value 0.209 means that 20.9% of HS6 lines included in HS 
section I are affected by at least one technical regulation NTM in at least one importing country.  
Results suggest that agricultural and food products (sections I through IV) are more affected by 
NTMs than manufactured products. The frequency ratio is indeed larger for these products. These 
industries have high numbers of countries’ notifications of sanitary and phytosanitary measures to the 
WTO. 
The next column of Table 1 reports the average AVE of these NTMs for each HS section allowing 
for the presence of externalities. The mean is computed over all importing countries and HS6 lines within 
each section. The mean AVE on the whole sample is equal to 0.044, but strong differences can be 
observed across sections. First, the magnitude of the mean AVE varies significantly across sections from 
0.002 to 0.083. All sections exhibit a non negative average AVE, indicating that technical regulation 
NTMs have, on average, a net negative impact on trade flows. For two sections (Pearls and precious 
metals and stones, and Arms and ammunition14), the average AVE is near zero, suggesting that NTMs 
have on average no net impact. In our sample, 12.1% of HS6 lines are affected by NTMs and 38.8% of 
them exhibit negative AVEs of NTMs. These negative AVEs are spread over all HS sections (and HS2 
sectors as shown in Appendix Table A.1). Column (3) of Table 1 underlines the upward bias affecting the 
estimation of AVEs when NTM are constrained to be trade-reducing. As expected, the average AVE for 
each HS section is systematically higher than the average AVE obtained in column (2). Using averages, 
the bias is about 100% (from 0.088 to 0.044). 
As highlighted with the frequency ratio, the share of HS6 lines subject to at least one NTM greatly 
differs across sections and could therefore bias the average AVE calculated using all HS6 lines. To control 
                                                            
14 The sector of arms and ammunition is least likely to observed commercial trade and standard-like NTM 
policies. 
 for this bias, columns (4) and (5) of Table 1 report the average AVE computed only on HS6 lines on 
which at least one technical measure NTM is applied. Column (4) allows for the presence of market 
imperfections and trade-facilitating NTMs, while column (5) does not. As expected, the average AVE 
computed only on HS6 lines subject to a technical regulation NTM is always higher in absolute value than 
the one based on all HS6 lines (with or without a NTM). Table 1 also shows that forcing technical 
regulation NTMs to be trade impeding leads to an even larger bias when looking at sectors for which at 
least one technical regulation NTM is present. This bias is particular strong for agricultural and food 
sectors (sections 1 through 4). For example, for section 4 (Prepared foodstuff), the constrained AVE 
estimates are on average twelve-fold larger (0.608 and 0.049).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 1: Frequency ratios and AVEs of technical-regulation NTMs, by HS section 
 
HS 
section 
codes 
HS section names 
Simple  
frequency 
ratio  
of NTMs 
AVE of NTMs 
all HS6 lines (mean) 
AVE of NTMs 
if NTM=1 (mean) 
   Unconstrained estimationa 
Constrained 
estimationb 
Unconstrained 
estimationa 
Constrained 
estimationb 
I Live animals, animal products 0.209 0.018 0.128 0.084 0.609 
II Vegetable products 0.223 0.028 0.128 0.126 0.574 
III Fats and oils 0.202 0.067 0.145 0.333 0.717 
IV Prepared foodstuffs, beverages, spirits, tobacco 0.259 0.013 0.157 0.049 0.608 
V Minerals 0.054 0.027 0.046 0.500 0.846 
VI Chemicals, allied industries 0.134 0.033 0.088 0.244 0.657 
VII Plastics, rubber 0.121 0.052 0.094 0.432 0.774 
VIII Hides, leather, furskins 0.074 0.029 0.056 0.395 0.763 
IX Wood and wood articles 0.105 0.051 0.077 0.486 0.732 
X Pulp of wood, paper, printing 0.096 0.039 0.071 0.404 0.744 
XI Textiles, apparel 0.097 0.033 0.068 0.339 0.695 
XII Footwear, headgear 0.103 0.025 0.064 0.241 0.622 
XIII Stone, cement, ceramic articles, glass 0.081 0.055 0.074 0.681 0.917 
XIV Pearls, precious metals and stones 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.732 0.732 
XV Base metals and articles 0.085 0.044 0.067 0.516 0.796 
XVI Machinery, electrical and video equipment 0.129 0.083 0.114 0.648 0.887 
XVII Vehicles, aircraft, vessels 0.109 0.035 0.080 0.317 0.730 
XVIII Optical, photo., medical instr. 0.096 0.042 0.074 0.441 0.775 
XIX Arms, ammunition 0.044 0.008 0.021 0.182 0.474 
XX Miscellaneous (furniture, toys, others) 0.108 0.062 0.100 0.570 0.925 
 All sections 0.121 0.044 0.088 0.362 0.729 
a: Unconstrained estimation means that impact of technical regulation NTMs on trade is not restricted in 
the econometric estimation. 
b: Constrained estimation means that technical regulation NTMs are constrained to have a non positive 
impact on trade in the estimation. 
 
Table 2 distinguishes between trade-reducing and trade facilitating NTM estimates using results 
from the unconstrained estimation (allowing for external effects). Again results are summarized by HS 
 section. The first column of Table 2 provides the share of technical regulation NTM-ridden observations 
with positive AVEs (trade-reducing NTMs). This share varies across sections, from 43.9% (Prepared 
foodstuffs) to 100% (Pearls, precious metals…). For 18 out of 20 sections, the majority of NTMs are 
trade-reducing (with a share above 50%). In total, 61.2% of NTM-ridden lines at the HS6 level are 
negatively affected by technical regulation NTMs.  
The last 2 columns of Table 2 show the mean AVE for trade-reducing technical regulation NTMs 
and that of trade-facilitating technical regulation NTMs by HS section. We previously noticed that these 
NTMs were more numerous on agricultural products. According to the second column of Table 2, the 
AVEs of trade-reducing NTMs on agricultural and food products are slightly higher than the ones 
obtained on most manufactured products. The average positive AVE for the whole sample is equal to 
1.133. In the last column of Table 2, AVEs of trade-facilitating NTMs are nonpositive of course, and 
because of the non-negative price constraint, they are included in the interval [-1;0]. Interestingly, we 
observe that the magnitude of these AVEs is high in absolute value. The minimum in absolute value per 
section is equal to -0.801 (section 19 Arms, ammunition) and the maximum (-0.912) is reached for section 
18 (Optical, photographic, medical instruments). The mean over all sections is -0.856. Conclusions remain 
valid at the HS 2-digit level (see Table A.2 of the Appendix).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 2. AVEs of trade-reducing and trade-facilitating technical regulation NTMs,  
by HS section 
 
HS 
section 
codes 
HS section names 
Share of trade-
reducing 
in NTM- ridden 
observations 
Mean AVE 
trade-reducing 
NTMs (AVE>0) 
Mean AVE 
trade-facilitating 
NTMs (AVE0) 
I Live animals, animal products 0.464 1.213 -0.892 
II Vegetable products 0.515 1.070 -0.876 
III Fats and oils 0.554 1.269 -0.829 
IV Prepared foodstuffs, beverages, spirits, tobacco 0.439 1.210 -0.860 
V Minerals 0.646 1.259 -0.884 
VI Chemicals, allied industries 0.551 1.130 -0.844 
VII Plastics, rubber 0.644 1.138 -0.846 
VIII Hides, leather, furskins 0.618 1.181 -0.873 
IX Wood and wood articles 0.709 1.025 -0.826 
X Pulp of wood, paper, printing 0.631 1.138 -0.853 
XI Textiles, apparel 0.637 1.031 -0.875 
XII Footwear, headgear 0.594 1.014 -0.889 
XIII Stone, cement, ceramic articles, glass 0.748 1.190 -0.829 
XIV Pearls, precious metals and stones 1.000 0.732 --  
XV Base metals and articles 0.696 1.096 -0.816 
XVI Machinery, electrical and video equipment 0.735 1.175 -0.817 
XVII Vehicles, aircraft, vessels 0.618 1.037 -0.847 
XVIII Optical, photo., medical instr. 0.655 1.155 -0.912 
XIX Arms, ammunition 0.672 0.663 -0.801 
XX Miscellaneous (furniture, toys, others) 0.653 1.341 -0.882 
 All sections 0.612 1.133 -0.856 
 
 
Figures 2 and 3 provide further insights on the technical regulation NTM AVES. Figure 2 shows 
the scattered plot of AVEs at HS6 level, average over all countries and sorted by HS2 line (x-axis 
 numbered from 1 to 96 for 96 HS2 lines). Results at the HS 2-digit level are consistent with previous 
conclusions and some heterogeneity is also observable across HS2 sectors in the magnitude of the AVEs 
of trade reducing and facilitating NTMs. The plot shows the density of negative (and positive15) AVEs for 
most HS2 lines, and in particular for Fish and crustaceans (line 3), Inorganic and Organic chemicals (lines 
28 and 29), and Iron and steel and Articles of iron and steel (lines 72 and 73), Nuclear reactors, Electrical 
machinery and equipment (lines 84 and 85), and Optical, photographic, measuring, precision and medical 
instruments (line 90). The plot also shows the presence of large positive outliers for many HS6 lines. 
Figure 3 shows the mean of the HS6 AVE averages by HS2 line when allowing for trade facilitating 
effects or not. All of the within-HS2 means are higher when constraining the estimation to exclude trade-
facilitation effects. Some unconstrained means are negative in Lac, gums and resins (line 13), Preparations 
of meat and fish (line 16), Cocoa (line 18), Pharmaceutical products (line 30) and Fertilizers (line 31), 
suggesting again the presence of a number of trade-facilitating standard-like NTM regimes in sector like 
agri-food sectors and chemicals. To offset that, positive average AVEs also abound suggesting trade-
reducing effects in various sectors most visibly in Preparations of cereals (line 19). For some HS 2-digit 
sectors, such as Live animals, Dairy products, Live trees, and Edible fruit and nuts, more than one quarter 
of the HS6 lines are subject to at least one technical regulation NTM in one importing country. By 
contrast, for a number of manufactured products, the share of HS6 lines impacted by a technical regulation 
NTM is lower to much lower. A strong exception is Pharmaceutical products (HS30) (frequency ratio of 
37.9%). Interestingly, sectors included in Textiles and apparel (section XI) and Footwear and headgear 
(section XII) for which the competition between Northern and Southern countries has been historically 
contentious, are not subject to many standard-like NTMs.  
To sum up, our results suggest the presence of both trade reducing and facilitating technical 
regulation NTMs, with substantial trade effects. Next, these AVEs of technical regulation NTMs are 
further used to calculate the TRI and MTRI. 
                                                            
 15 The plot is truncated from above at AVE=1 for better clarity and excludes less than 0.18% of the AVE estimates. 
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Figure 2. Scattered plot of HS6 level NTM AVES averaged over countries and shown by HS2 line 
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Figure 3. Mean and median (by HS2) of HS6 NTM AVEs average 
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 4.2. Trade restrictiveness indices  
Table 3 reports summary figures of the results for country-level MTRIs, TRIs and changes in 
TRIs. Three calculations are performed based on (i) tariffs only, (ii) overall protection using 
AVEs from the constrained estimation, and (iii) overall protection using unconstrained AVEs. 
The latter two sets of measures are also summarized for all AVE estimates and for the subset of 
significant AVE estimates based on the bootstrap standard errors. The summary statistics are 
presented for all 93 countries, OECD countries, Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and then 
BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries. 
The tariff only MTRI and TRI (1st and 6th columns in Table 3) represent the uniform tariff 
that would provide the same level of imports (MTRI) and welfare (TRI) as the initial tariff 
structure. OECD countries where in most cases except Japan and South Korea tariffs have been 
significantly reduced, exhibit smaller tariff-MTRIs than the 93-country averages, LDCs’ and 
especially the BRICs’ averages. According to detailed country results reported in Table A.3 of the 
Appendix, India has the highest tariff-MTRI (0.257) among the 93 countries; Brunei and South 
Korea have the highest tariff-TRI at or above 0.5. Hong-Kong and Singapore have zero tariff 
indices as they do not impose border tariffs.  
Columns (2) and (7) show the MTRI and TRI estimates including all distortions based on 
the AVEs from the estimation constraining NTMs to be trade reducing. As expected, MTRIs and 
TRIs exhibit larger values in columns (2) and (7) than those obtained using AVEs from the 
unconstrained estimation (see columns (4) and (9)). For example for the 93-country summary, the 
median and mean values of the MTRIs are respectively 0.117 and 0.158 with constrained 
estimates and only 0.048 and 0.057 with unconstrained estimates. Similarly, for the TRI the 
median and mean values are 0.293 and 0.325 (constrained estimation) versus 0.218 and 0.256 
(unconstrained estimation). In other words, for all countries included in our sample, the MTRIs 
based on overall protection (tariffs, production subsidies, and NTMs) and allowing for negative 
AVEs are equal or smaller than the MTRIs based on overall protection computed with the 
 constrained AVEs. This last result suggests that some technical regulation NTM regimes have 
trade facilitating effects for most countries. Finally, regardless of the estimation method, when 
comparing results using all AVE estimates or only the significant ones based on the bootstrap 
standard errors, one notes with the latter that ranges are reduced for most indices and Country 
groupings. 
Countries’ groupings also highlight interesting patterns. The OECD group exhibits 
negative MTRI values with a small mean (0.036). The LDC group shows all positive MTRIs. We 
also note that intuitively, many countries with low tariff-MTRIs exhibit negative total MTRIs 
because small tariffs do not counterbalance negative NTM AVEs. Lastly, using more 
disaggregated results by country (see Table A.3 of the Appendix), we note that only 28 over 93 
countries have MTRI values for overall protection and based on unconstrained estimates are 
higher than the values based on tariffs only. In addition, as suggested by Figure 4, MTRI for 
tariffs only and MTRIs for all distortions show a strong downward pattern when income per 
capita increases. From Figure 4 it is clear that MRTIs inclusive of all distortions tend to be lower 
than the MTRI for tariffs only, strongly suggesting that standard-like NTMs facilitate can trade. 
The analysis of the TRIs shows 24 countries with total TRIs based on unconstrained 
estimates smaller than the tariff-only TRI. These results show that positing protectionism of 
technical measure NTMs strongly biases the evaluation of the restrictiveness of these NTM trade 
policies. As previously mentioned, if equation (4) provides a negative dT (cf. supra), then the TRI 
level T cannot be computed using (5). The last columns of Tables 3 report the change in TRI, dT, 
i.e., the change in the index equivalent to the welfare impact of the policy interventions. Country-
level results indicate that for 17 over 93 countries, the change in TRI is negative (Table A.3 of the 
Appendix). Furthermore, for 25 over 93 countries, change in TRI values are smaller than the ones 
obtained when tariffs only are included in the computation (column (7) of Table A.3). These two 
last results highlight that some technical regulation NTMs can have positive welfare effects. Not 
surprisingly, many OECD countries exhibit negative dTRIs. This result is consistent with Disdier 
 et al. (2008)’s results showing intra-OECD agri-food trade being enhanced by NTM regimes. 
Several LDC countries also exhibit negative dTRIs and these can be rationalized by opportunities 
created with the agri-food trade integration and policy reforms. We have in mind the integration 
of LDCs in European trade following a sequence of structural adjustment policies that removed 
many protectionist NTMs, expanded preferential trade agreements and attempted to upgrade 
quality of goods. The latter induced upgrades of SPS regulations and improved food safety in 
countries like Côte d’Ivoire among others (FAO, 2003; Colen et al., 2012; and Maertens et al., 
2012). 
 
 Table 3. Trade restrictiveness indices, summary statistics 
Indices MTRI 
(Tmerc) 
Tmerc Tmccr Tmerc Tmerc TRI 
(T) 
T T T T TRI change
(dT) 
dT dT dT 
Protection tariffs overall protection tariffs overall protection overall protection 
Estimation  constrainedb unconstraineda  constrainedb unconstraineda constrainedb unconstraineda 
Estimates all all signif. all signif. all All signif. all signif. all signif. all signif. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
 All 93 countries 
Minimum 0.000 0.004 0.002 -0.360 -0.074 0.000 0.046 0.043 0.046 0.045 0.002 0.002 -0.266 -0.077 
Maximum 0.257 0.642 0.553 0.279 0.257 0.585 0.894 0.855 0.842 0.595 0.800 0.731 0.708 0.354 
Mean 0.081 0.158 0.140 0.057 0.073 0.142 0.325 0.279 0.256 0.185 0.144 0.114 0.064 0.040 
Median 0.072 0.117 0.112 0.048 0.066 0.121 0.293 0.221 0.218 0.139 0.086 0.049 0.039 0.016 
Std. dev 0.056 0.151 0.131 0.083 0.064 0.098 0.198 0.191 0.157 0.134 0.181 0.153 0.127 0.077 
 OECD countries 
Minimum 0.008 0.009 0.009 -0.106 -0.063 0.042 0.050 0.048 0.050 0.045 0.002 0.002 -0.103 -0.077 
Maximum 0.153 0.387 0.350 0.214 0.133 0.510 0.595 0.566 0.515 0.509 0.354 0.321 0.265 0.259 
Mean 0.041 0.070 0.061 0.036 0.035 0.111 0.270 0.191 0.234 0.127 0.088 0.056 0.054 0.019 
Median 0.028 0.041 0.035 0.030 0.022 0.069 0.272 0.161 0.216 0.093 0.074 0.026 0.039 0.005 
Std. dev 0.036 0.079 0.072 0.050 0.037 0.102 0.125 0.140 0.120 0.101 0.077 0.077 0.078 0.051 
 LDCs 
Minimum 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.007 0.029 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.003 
Maximum 0.174 0.598 0.508 0.172 0.236 0.220 0.773 0.713 0.520 0.443 0.598 0.508 0.270 0.196 
Mean 0.103 0.193 0.177 0.100 0.108 0.131 0.276 0.262 0.195 0.172 0.126 0.111 0.053 0.038 
Median 0.092 0.136 0.136 0.092 0.094 0.116 0.208 0.205 0.181 0.127 0.043 0.042 0.033 0.016 
Std. dev 0.043 0.180 0.150 0.052 0.056 0.054 0.234 0.216 0.130 0.117 0.202 0.175 0.076 0.057 
 BRICs 
Minimum 0.103 0.233 0.216 0.033 0.071 0.126 0.298 0.298 0.180 0.165 0.089 0.089 0.033 0.027 
Maximum 0.257 0.292 0.257 0.257 0.257 0.298 0.499 0.471 0.298 0.298 0.249 0.222 0.089 0.089 
Mean 0.151 0.261 0.242 0.107 0.142 0.190 0.417 0.399 0.249 0.231 0.179 0.163 0.064 0.057 
Median 0.123 0.260 0.247 0.069 0.120 0.168 0.435 0.413 0.260 0.231 0.190 0.171 0.068 0.056 
Std. dev 0.072 0.024 0.019 0.102 0.081 0.081 0.088 0.076 0.054 0.067 0.069 0.058 0.026 0.031 
a: Unconstrained estimation means that impact of NTMs on trade is not restricted in the econometric estimation. b: Constrained estimation 
means that NTMs are constrained to have a non positive impact on trade in the estimation. OECD: all OECD members included in our sample. 
BRICs: Brazil, Russia, India and China. LDCs: Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Rwanda, Sudan, Senegal, 
Uganda, Zambia. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 4. MTRIs for tariffs and MTRIs for all distorsions against income par capida 
 
 
 5. Conclusion 
We extend the TRI approach to a small distorted open economy to account for market 
imperfections (externalities, asymmetric information) and NTM domestic regulations addressing 
them. Up to date, the presence of externalities and potential anti-protectionist effects of standard-
like 
NTMs has been ignored in TRI application. Allowing for such occurrence, we derive the AVEs 
of NTMs, as well as the TRIs and MTRIs equivalent to all policy interventions (tariffs, NTMs 
and production subsidies). We show that in general the impact of NTMs on import demand is 
ambiguous depending on the relative strength of the import-facilitating effects of NTMs via a 
shift in import demand, and the protective effect of the same NTMs at the border. We then apply 
the approach to the UNCTAD-Comtrade database built by Kee et al. (2009). In our sample, 12% 
of HS6 lines are affected by technical regulation NTMs and about 39% of these (4.7% of all HS6 
lines) show negative AVEs of technical regulation NTMs. The MTRI and TRI results show the 
sizeable changes in estimated aggregate trade and welfare effects of existing trade policies. Policy 
recommendations on the impacts of NTMs will be biased by overstating their trade reducing and 
welfare decreasing effects. 
Although we show it is possible to rationalize and econometrically identify trade- 
facilitating effects of NTMs mitigating external effects and other market imperfections or having 
anti-protectionist effects on domestic suppliers, we do so using relatively simple NTM proxies 
and aggregate trade flows rather than bilateral ones. It would be interesting to refine these results 
and use more detailed NTM measures and bilateral trade data, and focus on a subset of sectors for 
which we identify negative NTM AVEs. Nevertheless our results corroborate the trade-
facilitating effects found in the literature for some products and countries (e.g. Disdier et al., 
2008; Moenius, 2004). The value added of our analysis is to formalize the possibility of anti-
protectionist effects or external effects and their mitigation through regulations affecting quality 
of products and identify their effects on trade restrictiveness. Our analysis also extends the 
 applicability of the TRI framework to more plausible market conditions and lets the data reveal 
unconstrained patterns. 
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Appendix  
 
Table A.1. Frequency ratios and AVEs of NTMs, by HS 2-digit sector 
HS 
sections 
HS2 
codes HS2 names 
Simple 
freq. 
ratio 
of 
NTMs
AVE of NTMs AVE of NTMs 
all HS6 lines (mean) if NTM=1 (mean) 
      
Unconstr. 
estimation*
Constrained 
estimation 
Unconstr. 
estimation*
Constrained 
estimation 
I 1 Live animals 0.262 0.017 0.167 0.066 0.638 
 2 Meat & edible meat offal 0.219 0.027 0.148 0.123 0.674 
 3 Fish and crustaceans 0.180 0.017 0.107 0.097 0.596 
 4 Dairy products, eggs 0.313 0.000 0.173 0.000 0.552 
 5 Products of animal origin 0.112 0.024 0.066 0.218 0.592 
II 6 Live trees & other plans, bulbs, roots 0.304 0.019 0.153 0.061 0.503 
 7 Edible vegetables 0.234 0.037 0.138 0.157 0.590 
 8 Edible fruit and nuts 0.265 0.043 0.151 0.161 0.572 
 9 Coffee, tea, maté 0.224 -0.001 0.117 -0.003 0.521 
 10 Cereals 0.223 0.087 0.190 0.392 0.852 
 11 Products of the milling industry 0.191 0.072 0.121 0.376 0.633 
 12 Oil seeds & oleaginous fruits 0.199 0.008 0.110 0.042 0.552 
 13 Lac, gums & resins 0.206 -0.086 0.050 -0.418 0.244 
 14 Vegetable plaiting materials 0.108 0.014 0.080 0.129 0.741 
III 15 Animal or vegetable fats and oils 0.202 0.067 0.145 0.333 0.717 
IV 16 Preparations of meat, of fish 0.309 -0.090 0.105 -0.290 0.339 
 17 Sugars 0.278 -0.027 0.150 -0.097 0.540 
 18 Cocoa  0.250 -0.077 0.092 -0.309 0.366 
 19 Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk 0.385 0.310 0.427 0.805 1.110 
 20 Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts 0.274 0.018 0.170 0.065 0.619
 21 Miscellaneous edible preparations 0.317 0.018 0.208 0.056 0.658 
 22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar 0.204 -0.023 0.105 -0.111 0.514 
 23 Residues and waste from the food industries 0.120 0.003 0.082 0.026 0.681 
 24 Tobacco 0.193 0.026 0.098 0.137 0.508 
V 25 Salt 0.053 0.027 0.045 0.511 0.855 
 26 Ores, slag and ash 0.023 0.007 0.013 0.307 0.585 
 27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils 0.085 0.045 0.076 0.531 0.896 
VI 28 Inorganic chemicals 0.093 0.043 0.076 0.465 0.814 
 29 Organic chemicals 0.130 0.044 0.091 0.339 0.705 
 30 Pharmaceutical products 0.379 -0.056 0.184 -0.147 0.485 
 31 Fertilizers 0.199 -0.036 0.076 -0.181 0.383 
 32 Tanning or dyeing extracts 0.126 0.076 0.102 0.602 0.813 
 33 Essential oils and resinoids 0.229 -0.062 0.087 -0.271 0.382 
 34 Soaps 0.171 0.008 0.087 0.047 0.510 
 35 Albuminoidal substances 0.149 0.002 0.062 0.012 0.417 
 36 Explosives 0.078 0.036 0.048 0.464 0.613 
 37 Photographic or cinematographic goods 0.075 0.050 0.069 0.666 0.920 
 38 Miscellaneous chemical products 0.119 0.040 0.082 0.340 0.692 
VII 39 Plastics and articles 0.122 0.048 0.088 0.392 0.715 
 40 Rubber and articles 0.119 0.061 0.106 0.511 0.890 
VIII 41 Raw hides and skins 0.077 0.051 0.078 0.668 1.017 
 42 Leather 0.097 0.012 0.053 0.119 0.549 
 43 Fur skins and artificial fur 0.036 0.010 0.017 0.270 0.480 
IX 44 Wood and articles of wood 0.110 0.048 0.075 0.433 0.679 
   
 45 Cork and articles 0.074 0.135 0.141 1.831 1.915 
 46 Straw 0.081 -0.014 0.020 -0.177 0.246 
X 47 Pulp of wood 0.058 0.061 0.084 1.062 1.457 
 48 Paper 0.106 0.028 0.066 0.262 0.627 
 49 Printed books, newspapers 0.075 0.080 0.088 1.065 1.166 
XI 50 Silk 0.041 0.015 0.029 0.366 0.702 
 51 Wool 0.079 0.053 0.081 0.665 1.025 
 52 Cotton 0.096 0.017 0.061 0.182 0.635 
 53 Other vegetable textile fibres 0.071 0.030 0.047 0.423 0.665 
 54 Man-made filaments 0.118 0.013 0.060 0.107 0.506
 55 Man-made staple fibres 0.105 0.017 0.062 0.160 0.593 
 56 Wadding 0.115 0.051 0.082 0.447 0.711 
 57 Carpets 0.096 0.050 0.075 0.518 0.782 
 58 Special woven fabrics 0.081 0.032 0.054 0.395 0.666 
 59 Impregnated, coated, covered, lamin. textile fabrics 0.095 0.058 0.087 0.607 0.918 
 60 Knitted or crocheted fabrics 0.087 0.046 0.076 0.529 0.878 
 61 Apparel & clothing accessories, knitted/ crocheted 0.090 0.029 0.061 0.327 0.681 
 62 Apparel & clothing access., not knitted/ crocheted 0.109 0.051 0.082 0.468 0.755 
 63 Other made-up textile articles 0.094 0.058 0.084 0.611 0.887 
XII 64 Footwear 0.149 0.026 0.086 0.176 0.579 
 65 Headgear 0.055 0.022 0.048 0.412 0.876 
 66 Umbrellas 0.052 0.015 0.028 0.286 0.535 
 67 Feathers 0.045 0.031 0.036 0.697 0.805 
XIII 68 Stone articles 0.058 0.051 0.059 0.875 1.018 
 69 Ceramic products 0.099 0.024 0.058 0.247 0.586 
 70 Glass articles 0.092 0.074 0.095 0.804 1.037 
XIV 71 Pearls, precious stones and metals 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.732 0.732 
XV 72 Iron & steel 0.084 0.034 0.062 0.408 0.746 
 73 Articles of iron or steel 0.110 0.048 0.075 0.441 0.679 
 74 Copper 0.064 0.025 0.047 0.386 0.739 
 75 Nickel 0.026 0.034 0.038 1.300 1.443 
 76 Aluminum 0.099 0.026 0.060 0.259 0.605 
 78 Lead 0.031 0.050 0.057 1.605 1.841 
 79 Zinc 0.057 0.015 0.041 0.269 0.711 
 80 Tin 0.041 0.031 0.032 0.737 0.785 
 81 Other base metals 0.022 0.052 0.055 2.327 2.461 
 82 Tools 0.110 0.079 0.106 0.720 0.962 
 83 Miscellaneous articles of base metal 0.095 0.056 0.077 0.592 0.810 
XVI 84 Nuclear reactors 0.118 0.087 0.111 0.736 0.940 
 85 Electrical machinery & equipment 0.150 0.077 0.121 0.516 0.806 
XVII 86 Railway 0.057 0.057 0.060 0.994 1.053 
 87 Vehicles 0.150 0.034 0.105 0.230 0.697
 88 Aircraft 0.045 0.030 0.036 0.667 0.799 
 89 Ships, boats 0.052 0.008 0.032 0.149 0.613 
XVIII 90 Optical, photog., measuring, prec., medical instr. 0.136 0.060 0.106 0.443 0.777 
 91 Clocks and watches 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 92 Musical instruments 0.045 0.018 0.033 0.400 0.737 
XIX 93 Arms and ammunitions 0.044 0.008 0.021 0.182 0.474 
XX 94 Furniture 0.114 0.081 0.129 0.712 1.136 
 95 Toys 0.127 0.053 0.100 0.419 0.788 
  96 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.088 0.054 0.078 0.618 0.890 
*Unconstrained estimation means that impact of NTMs on trade is not restricted in the econometric estimation. 
Constrained estimation means that NTMs are constrained to have a non positive impact on trade in the estimation. 
   
Table A.2. AVEs of trade-reducing and trade-facilitating NTMs, by HS 2-digit sector 
 
HS2 
codes HS2 names 
Share of trade-
reducing in NTM- 
ridden observations 
Mean AVE 
trade-reducing 
NTMs (AVE>0) 
Mean AVE 
trade-facilitating 
NTMs (AVE0) 
01 Live animals 0.408 1.495 -0.919 
02 Meat & edible meat offal 0.446 1.394 -0.899 
03 Fish and crustaceans 0.504 1.071 -0.893 
04 Dairy products, eggs 0.408 1.267 -0.875 
05 Products of animal origin 0.616 0.888 -0.858 
06 Live trees & other plans, bulbs, roots 0.525 0.903 -0.868 
07 Edible vegetables 0.537 1.034 -0.862 
08 Edible fruit and nuts 0.529 1.084 -0.878 
09 Coffee, tea, maté 0.473 0.994 -0.899 
10 Cereals 0.542 1.533 -0.956 
11 Products of the milling industry 0.648 1.035 -0.834 
12 Oil seeds & oleaginous fruits 0.467 1.119 -0.900 
13 Lac, gums & resins 0.267 0.597 -0.788 
14 Vegetable plaiting materials 0.487 1.263 -0.948 
15 Animal or vegetable fats and oils 0.554 1.269 -0.829 
16 Preparations of meat, of fish 0.329 0.866 -0.858 
17 Sugars 0.344 1.470 -0.921 
18 Cocoa 0.322 1.012 -0.936 
19 Preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk 0.641 1.557 -0.539 
20 Preparations of vegetables, fruit, nuts 0.454 1.172 -0.856 
21 Miscellaneous edible preparations 0.424 1.384 -0.923 
22 Beverages, spirits and vinegar 0.414 1.079 -0.952 
23 Residues and waste from the food industries 0.518 0.878 -0.892 
24 Tobacco 0.503 1.055 -0.795 
25 Salt 0.674 1.188 -0.890 
26 Ores, slag and ash 0.712 0.793 -0.893 
27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils 0.596 1.483 -0.878 
28 Inorganic chemicals 0.629 1.226 -0.827 
29 Organic chemicals 0.594 1.156 -0.859 
30 Pharmaceutical products 0.344 1.211 -0.858 
31 Fertilizers 0.379 0.937 -0.862 
32 Tanning or dyeing extracts 0.732 1.100 -0.757 
33 Essential oils and resinoids 0.299 1.032 -0.828 
34 Soaps 0.492 0.933 -0.809 
35 Albuminoidal substances 0.577 0.666 -0.882 
36 Explosives 0.768 0.861 -0.849 
37 Photographic or cinematographic goods 0.738 1.197 -0.826 
38 Miscellaneous chemical products 0.626 1.055 -0.856 
39 Plastics and articles 0.659 1.025 -0.833 
40 Rubber and articles 0.616 1.372 -0.869 
41 Raw hides and skins 0.656 1.483 -0.885 
42 Leather 0.529 0.983 -0.851 
43 Fur skins and artificial fur 0.784 0.609 -0.964 
44 Wood and articles of wood 0.725 0.924 -0.863 
45 Cork and articles 0.795 2.507 -0.799 
46 Straw 0.381 0.514 -0.603 
47 Pulp of wood 0.600 2.381 -0.917 
48 Paper 0.603 0.989 -0.843 
   
49 Printed books, newspapers 0.884 1.334 -0.973 
50 Silk 0.647 1.081 -0.943 
51 Wool 0.622 1.616 -0.903 
52 Cotton 0.537 1.098 -0.879 
53 Other vegetable textile fibres 0.761 0.859 -0.968 
54 Man-made filaments 0.602 0.749 -0.865 
55 Man-made staple fibres 0.572 0.929 -0.867 
56 Wadding 0.739 0.910 -0.866 
57 Carpets 0.701 1.080 -0.798 
58 Special woven fabrics 0.665 1.076 -0.962 
59 Impregnated, coated, covered or laminated textile fabrics 0.662 1.302 -0.753 
60 Knitted or crocheted fabrics 0.607 1.465 -0.918 
61 Articles of apparel & clothing accessories, knitted/ crocheted 0.621 1.058 -0.871 
62 Art. of apparel & clothing accessories, not knitted/ crocheted 0.732 0.955 -0.863 
63 Other made-up textile articles 0.718 1.208 -0.905 
64 Footwear 0.563 1.002 -0.886 
65 Headgear 0.558 1.495 -0.953 
66 Umbrellas 0.719 0.682 -0.726 
67 Feathers 0.903 0.879 -1.000 
68 Stone articles 0.813 1.245 -0.741 
69 Ceramic products 0.635 0.880 -0.855 
70 Glass articles 0.771 1.293 -0.848 
71 Pearls, precious stones and metals 1.000 0.732 - 
72 Iron & steel 0.629 1.124 -0.806 
73 Articles of iron or steel 0.747 0.866 -0.816 
74 Copper 0.614 1.159 -0.843 
75 Nickel 0.833 1.727 -0.837 
76 Aluminum 0.598 0.989 -0.828 
78 Lead 0.815 2.194 -0.988 
79 Zinc 0.608 1.087 -1.000 
80 Tin 0.931 0.834 -0.574 
81 Other base metals 0.868 2.823 -0.922 
82 Tools 0.742 1.241 -0.780 
83 Miscellaneous articles of base metal 0.770 1.013 -0.819 
84 Nuclear reactors 0.766 1.212 -0.819 
85 Electrical machinery & equipment 0.690 1.115 -0.815 
86 Railway 0.942 1.112 -0.910 
87 Vehicles 0.573 1.024 -0.838 
88 Aircraft 0.814 1.015 -0.848 
89 Ships, boats 0.553 1.036 -0.947 
90 Optical, photographic, measuring, precision, medical instr. 0.654 1.159 -0.911 
91 Clocks and watches - - - 
92 Musical instruments 0.663 1.077 -0.931 
93 Arms and ammunitions 0.672 0.663 -0.801 
94 Furniture 0.593 1.800 -0.871 
95 Toys 0.644 1.151 -0.904 
96 Miscellaneous manufactured articles 0.723 1.186 -0.863 
   
Table A.3. Trade restrictiveness indices, by country 
 
Country T
merc T
merc Tmerc  T T T dT dT dT 
 Tariffs Overall protection Tariffs Overall protection Tariffs Overall protection 
  Constrained estimation 
Unconstr. 
estimation*,1  
Constrained 
estimation
Unconstr. 
estimation*  
Constrained 
estimation
Unconstr. 
estimation* 
Albania 0.118 0.127 0.114 0.135 0.161 0.122 0.018 0.026 0.015 
Argentina 0.130 0.178 0.121 0.142 0.324 0.265 0.020 0.105 0.070 
Australia 0.058 0.149 0.056 0.097 0.314 0.150 0.009 0.098 0.022 
Austria 0.016 0.026 0.023 0.055 0.407 0.236 0.003 0.166 0.055 
Belgium 0.021 0.033 0.031 0.068 0.328 0.272 0.005 0.108 0.074 
Burkina Faso 0.106 0.163 0.143 0.121 0.292 0.267 0.015 0.085 0.071 
Bangladesh 0.172 0.172 0.172 0.220 0.220 0.220 0.049 0.049 0.049 
Belarus 0.085 0.168 0.084 0.106 0.323 0.211 0.011 0.105 0.045 
Bolivia 0.080 0.122 0.020 0.087 0.228  0.008 0.052 -0.026 
Brazil 0.109 0.262 0.033 0.131 0.463 0.180 0.017 0.214 0.033 
Brunei 0.148 0.196 0.158 0.585 0.863 0.842 0.343 0.745 0.708 
Canada 0.028 0.041 -0.052 0.077 0.117  0.006 0.014 -0.063 
Switzerland 0.041 0.041 0.041 0.195 0.198 0.198 0.038 0.039 0.039 
Chile 0.069 0.103 0.052 0.069 0.207 0.070 0.005 0.043 0.005 
China 0.137 0.233 0.083 0.206 0.407 0.233 0.042 0.166 0.054 
Ivory Coast 0.093 0.323 -0.360 0.117 0.543  0.014 0.294 -0.266 
Cameroon 0.139 0.162 0.139 0.159 0.221 0.175 0.025 0.049 0.031 
Colombia 0.112 0.235 -0.009 0.131 0.460 0.258 0.017 0.212 0.067 
Costa Rica 0.041 0.041 0.040 0.072 0.082 0.073 0.005 0.007 0.005 
Czech Rep.  0.041 0.047 0.030 0.063 0.087  0.004 0.008 -0.003 
Germany 0.015 0.022 0.020 0.049 0.293 0.219 0.002 0.086 0.048 
Denmark 0.018 0.027 0.034 0.047 0.258 0.487 0.002 0.067 0.237 
Algeria 0.131 0.478 0.006 0.160 0.704 0.366 0.026 0.496 0.134 
Egypt 0.128 0.571 0.152 0.197 0.837 0.617 0.039 0.700 0.380 
Spain 0.015 0.032 0.030 0.056 0.341 0.313 0.003 0.116 0.098 
Estonia 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Ethiopia 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.181 0.181 0.181 0.033 0.033 0.033 
Finland 0.011 0.020 0.017 0.043 0.263 0.188 0.002 0.069 0.035 
France 0.014 0.020 0.019 0.046 0.226 0.199 0.002 0.051 0.039 
Gabon 0.153 0.155 0.157 0.175 0.180 0.178 0.031 0.032 0.032 
Great Britain 0.019 0.028 0.026 0.092 0.271 0.216 0.008 0.073 0.047 
Ghana 0.145 0.190 0.128 0.247 0.381 0.308 0.061 0.145 0.095 
Greece 0.013 0.027 0.026 0.052 0.354 0.347 0.003 0.125 0.120 
Guatemala 0.068 0.086 0.001 0.098 0.158  0.010 0.025 -0.037 
Hong Kong 0.000 0.004 -0.009 0.000 0.053  0.000 0.003 -0.009 
Honduras 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.080 0.080 0.080 0.006 0.006 0.006 
Hungary 0.061 0.069 0.039 0.088 0.125  0.008 0.016 -0.007 
Indonesia 0.045 0.073 0.025 0.083 0.333 0.259 0.007 0.111 0.067 
India 0.257 0.257 0.257 0.298 0.298 0.298 0.089 0.089 0.089 
Ireland 0.008 0.012 0.011 0.042 0.134 0.112 0.002 0.018 0.013 
Iceland 0.032 0.032 0.032 0.128 0.131 0.131 0.016 0.017 0.017 
Italy 0.017 0.027 0.026 0.073 0.272 0.248 0.005 0.074 0.062 
Jordan 0.119 0.261 0.092 0.162 0.439 0.279 0.026 0.193 0.078 
Japan 0.082 0.088 0.054 0.330 0.364 0.216 0.109 0.133 0.047 
Kazakhstan 0.043 0.146 -0.006 0.075 0.320  0.006 0.103 -0.031 
   
Kenya 0.117 0.117 0.117 0.183 0.183 0.183 0.033 0.033 0.033 
South Korea 0.107 0.108 0.108 0.510 0.515 0.515 0.260 0.265 0.265 
Lebanon 0.057 0.116 -0.029 0.098 0.265  0.010 0.070 -0.037 
Sri Lanka 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.138 0.138 0.138 0.019 0.019 0.019 
Lithuania 0.021 0.053 -0.045 0.064 0.177  0.004 0.031 -0.054 
Latvia 0.028 0.099 -0.046 0.073 0.261  0.005 0.068 -0.050 
Morocco 0.228 0.594 0.083 0.275 0.894 0.677 0.076 0.800 0.458 
Moldova 0.048 0.048 0.048 0.205 0.205 0.205 0.042 0.042 0.042 
Madagascar 0.029 0.029 0.029 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.002 0.002 0.002 
Mexico 0.153 0.387 0.214 0.213 0.595 0.485 0.045 0.354 0.235 
Mali 0.095 0.112 0.091 0.110 0.176 0.113 0.012 0.031 0.013 
Mauritius 0.122 0.159 0.106 0.232 0.321 0.250 0.054 0.103 0.062 
Malawi 0.091 0.148 0.138 0.122 0.263 0.247 0.015 0.069 0.061 
Malaysia 0.063 0.302 0.155 0.269 0.559 0.429 0.072 0.312 0.184 
Nigeria 0.219 0.475 -0.065 0.307 0.677 0.342 0.094 0.458 0.117 
Nicaragua 0.048 0.130 0.002 0.080 0.304  0.006 0.092 -0.003 
Netherlands 0.014 0.025 0.024 0.061 0.322 0.298 0.004 0.104 0.089 
Norway 0.046 0.060 0.023 0.258 0.293 0.182 0.066 0.086 0.033 
New Zealand 0.028 0.176 0.094 0.045 0.426 0.332 0.002 0.182 0.110 
Oman 0.117 0.157 0.078 0.258 0.340 0.207 0.067 0.116 0.043 
Peru 0.126 0.243 0.083 0.129 0.426 0.250 0.017 0.182 0.063 
Philippines 0.037 0.642 0.279 0.068 0.788 0.592 0.005 0.621 0.350 
Pap. N. Guinea 0.035 0.035 0.034 0.166 0.173 0.169 0.028 0.030 0.029 
Poland 0.104 0.118 0.080 0.151 0.212 0.137 0.023 0.045 0.019 
Portugal 0.037 0.050 0.047 0.176 0.304 0.252 0.031 0.092 0.063 
Paraguay 0.119 0.219 0.029 0.130 0.351  0.017 0.123 -0.026 
Romania 0.120 0.143 0.065 0.157 0.225  0.025 0.050 -0.009 
Russia 0.103 0.292 0.055 0.126 0.499 0.287 0.016 0.249 0.082 
Rwanda 0.092 0.092 0.092 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.013 0.013 0.013 
Saudi Arabia 0.142 0.158 0.152 0.350 0.374 0.367 0.123 0.140 0.135 
Sudan 0.174 0.598 0.145 0.215 0.773 0.520 0.046 0.598 0.270 
Senegal 0.086 0.488 0.007 0.108 0.676 0.227 0.012 0.457 0.051 
Singapore 0.000 0.108 0.046 0.000 0.312 0.214 0.000 0.097 0.046 
El Salvador 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.101 0.101 0.101 0.010 0.010 0.010 
Slovenia 0.102 0.230 0.052 0.121 0.398 0.207 0.015 0.158 0.043 
Sweden 0.015 0.019 0.018 0.053 0.180 0.152 0.003 0.032 0.023 
Thailand 0.110 0.135 0.088 0.169 0.252 0.173 0.028 0.064 0.030 
Trinidad & T. 0.072 0.072 0.072 0.298 0.298 0.298 0.089 0.089 0.089 
Tunisia 0.229 0.400 0.157 0.300 0.576 0.395 0.090 0.331 0.156 
Turkey 0.044 0.046 0.046 0.096 0.107 0.106 0.009 0.011 0.011 
Tanzania 0.137 0.618 0.249 0.160 0.880 0.713 0.026 0.774 0.509 
Uganda 0.066 0.067 0.065 0.083 0.085 0.078 0.007 0.007 0.006 
Ukraine 0.064 0.134 -0.108 0.154 0.383  0.024 0.147 -0.085 
Uruguay 0.097 0.220 -0.075 0.117 0.460  0.014 0.212 -0.035 
United States 0.025 0.091 -0.106 0.050 0.273  0.003 0.075 -0.103 
Venezuela 0.136 0.234 0.044 0.159 0.396 0.141 0.025 0.157 0.020 
South Africa 0.070 0.075 0.067 0.133 0.149 0.128 0.018 0.022 0.016 
Zambia 0.086 0.115 0.083 0.113 0.208 0.128 0.013 0.043 0.016 
*Unconstrained estimation means that impact of NTMs on trade is not restricted in the econometric estimation. 
Constrained estimation means that NTMs are constrained to have a non positive impact on trade in the estimation. 
1 With an externality and some negative AVEs, the MTRI can be smaller or larger than the TRI and the two indices 
may not have similar signs. : LDCs. : BRIC countries. : OECD countries. 
